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Abstract
We examine a Japanese Panel Survey in order to check whether self-reported
risk aversion varies over time. In most panels, risk attitude variables are collected
only once (found in only one survey wave), and it is assumed that self-reported
risk aversion reflects the individual’s time-invariant component of preferences to-
ward risk. Nonetheless, the question could be asked as to whether the financial
and macro shocks a person faces over his lifetime modify his risk aversion. Our em-
pirical analysis provides evidence that risk aversion is composed of a time-variant
part and shows that the variation cannot be ascribed to measurement error or noise
given that it is related to income shocks. Taking into account the fact that there
are time-variant factors in risk aversion, we investigate how often it is preferable to
collect the risk aversion measure in long panel surveys. Our result suggests that the
best predictor of current behavior is the average of risk aversion, where risk aversion
is collected every two years. It is therefore advisable for risk aversion measures to
be collected every two years in long panel surveys.
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1 Introduction
Is risk aversion innate and immutable, as is usually assumed in the economic literature,
or rather time-variant and a function of a persons experiences over his lifetime? Basically,
do individual preferences toward risk change with such events as wealth accumulation,
disease, job loss and parenthood? Given that the psychology literature suggests that
personality can change over time (Lucas and Donnellan (2011), Boyce et al. (2013)), we
ask the question as to whether individual risk attitudes can also vary across the life span.
Risk preferences have been extensively used in empirical work to study individual
decision-making. It is therefore vital to gain a better understanding of what surveys
actually capture and whether this variable might vary across fields or over time. In other
words, what researchers need to address when using risk attitudes taken from micro-level
data surveys is the validity of the drawn risk aversion parameter. Although a great deal
of empirical literature on this issue focuses on the measurement of risk tolerance and its
stability across methodologies,1 the question of the stability of risk aversion over time is
assumed rather than proven empirically.2 Nevertheless, the sensitivity of risk aversion
to financial and personal shocks can be problematic since it could cause endogeneity or
reverse causality issues when preferences toward risk are used as an explanatory variable.
For example, imagine someone wins a lottery (positive income shock), which possibly
drives down his risk aversion. If we only have one risk aversion measure, which was
collected when he was more risk averse, the coefficient estimated taking this measure in
order to predict current behavior would be biased toward zero (underestimation). So
investigating whether risk attitudes are stable or changeable, and if they are changeable,
finding these variations main factors are crucial steps if we are to make proper use of
survey data.
1See for instance Binswanger (1980), Anderson and Mellor (2008), Ding et al. (2010), Dohmen et al.
(2011) and Hardeweg et al. (2012)
2While Harrison et al. (2005), Baucells and Villass (2010), Sahm (2008), and Andersen et al. (2008)
claim that risk aversion is stable over time, Staw (1976), Thaler and Johnson (1990), Weber and Zuchel
(2005), Brunnermeier and Nagel (2008), and Malmendier and Nagel (2011) find a change in financial
risk-taking behaviors over time.
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The main problem researchers face when investigating the time stability of individual
risk tolerance is data availability. In economic theory, risk aversion is assumed to be
innate and time invariant, i.e. it is considered to be an exogenous characteristic of the
person. This has led many surveys to include risk attitude questions only once: namely,
at baseline, when the individual enters the database. This is, for instance, the case with
the British Household Panel Study (BHPS) and the Korean Labor Income Panel Study
(KLIPS). Nonetheless, some surveys do repeatedly measure risk attitudes. For example,
the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) includes hypothetical gambles with respect to
lifetime income in all its waves. Sahm (2008) uses this feature of the data to investigate
the stability of individual risk tolerance.
In this article, we use the Osaka Panel Study where individuals were surveyed annually
from 2003 to 2010 and risk aversion questions were included in all waves. This framework
enables us to explore whether the risk aversion responses of individuals who experience
shocks are stable. Basically, we set out to provide evidence of the existence of a time-
variant component of risk aversion and to shed light on the factors that influence this
aspect of risk preferences. Using panel data and a self-reported risk aversion measure, we
find empirical evidence that (i) survey risk aversion has a time-variant dimension, and
that (ii) individuals for whom elicited risk attitudes vary experience specific shocks not
faced by agents with stable risk preferences. We believe that the expected, significant
correlation between the observed variation in individual risk aversion and shocks (in terms
of income, labor and personal belongings) provides convincing evidence of the existence
of a time-variant component of risk aversion, possible measurement error (noise) aside.
Basically, our results roughly show that (self-reported) risk aversion changes every year
and is affected by income and health variations. This finding suggests that variation over
time is more than merely noise, since it is correlated with recent shocks. Nevertheless,
the variation in risk attitudes does not appear to significantly affect the change in risky
behavior, i.e. the time-variant component of risk preferences might be temporary and
3
not large enough to change a persons behavior.
When collecting panel data, the assumption of risk aversion stability is used in sup-
port of the choice of measuring preferences toward risk only once (often during the first
wave). However, given that there are time-varying factors in risk aversion, collecting risk
aversion more than once could improve the quality of the analyses. Our findings show
that using an average measure of risk aversion increases predictive power for current be-
haviors compared to the use of current risk aversion. It provides a guideline for longer
panels: it could be useful to collect risk aversion several times, since the age factor and
accumulation of changes in income and health also determine risk attitudes.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The related literature is presented
in section 2. Section 3 discusses the potential time-variant and time-invariant factors of
risk aversion and presents the data used in this paper. The existence of a time-variant
component is highlighted in section 4 along with the respective importance of the two
dimensions of risk aversion. This section also provides evidence of optimal times for
collecting risk aversion in panel surveys. Section 5 concludes.
2 Literature
Risk preference is a key factor put forward by economists to explain individual decisions.
Many published articles have emphasized the influence of risk aversion on risky behaviors
in financial matters (portfolio assets, savings and indebtedness), in the choice of occupa-
tion (sector of work and risky tasks) and in health (smoking and drinking). At the same
time, the most suitable way of measuring risk aversion, which is not a directly observable
individual characteristic, has been extensively investigated. A range of different method-
ologies have been used from qualitative scales and hypothetical questions to summated
rating scores and lotteries. In addition to this methodological literature, many studies
look at the stability of risk aversion across methodologies in order to see whether some
4
measures outperform others in their capacity to predict risky behaviors. Yet the stability
of individual preferences toward risk over time has not really been investigated empiri-
cally. This could be due to: (i) the theoretical assumption that risk aversion is innate
and immutable, and (ii) the lack of data available to study this issue.
In the theoretical models put forward by Constantinides (1990) and Campbell and
Cochrane (1999), risk aversion varies with changes in wealth, habits and background risk.
In a more recent consumption-based pricing model, Brandt and Wang (2003) included a
time-varying aggregate risk aversion parameter and empirically tested whether aggregate
risk preferences do indeed vary in response to news about inflation using DRI consumption
data.
The empirical studies focusing on time-varying risk aversion consider different mea-
sures of risk aversion. Brunnermeier and Nagel (2008), for instance, used asset allocation
to proxy risk preferences and found that transitory increases in liquid wealth play no
role in explaining changes in asset allocation for households that participate in the stock
market. Guiso et al. (2013) drew on a repeated survey of a large sample of Italian Bank
customers to measure individual risk attitudes using a Holt and Laury (2002) strategy.
Basically, respondents were asked to choose between a fixed lottery and different safe
amounts.3,4 They investigated its stability based on the 2008 financial crisis. These au-
thors found that changes in risk aversion after the crisis were correlated with portfolio
choices, but not with wealth, consumption habits or background risk. The authors subse-
quently conducted a lab experiment where participants were exposed to a horror movie.
This experiment showed that this particular psychological factor - fear - could influence
risk aversion to a greater extent than its ‘classical standard’ determinants. Sahm (2008)
studied hypothetical gambles with lifetime income from the 1992-2002 Health and Re-
3In the risky outlook, individuals had a fifty percent chance of earning 10,000 euros and a fifty percent
chance of earning nothing. The sure amounts of money offered ranged between 100 and 9,000 euros.
4Where Holt and Laury (2002) offered two lotteries with different pay-off spreads, Hardeweg et al.
(2012) and Dohmen et al. (2010) also used a fixed lottery vs. safe amounts to capture the risk aversion
of rural Thai farmers and German citizens respectively.
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tirement Study to investigate whether individuals changed their risk aversion over that
period. She found that risk tolerance changes with age and macroeconomic conditions,
but argued that differences in risk aversion are mainly located across, and not within, in-
dividuals. She took a panel of 12,000 respondents covering a decade and found relatively
stable risk preferences. She showed that major life events such as job displacement and
the diagnosis of a serious health condition do not permanently alter the willingness to
take further risks.
However, other studies have argued that individual risk tolerance can change follow-
ing health shocks. De Martino et al. (2010) found that amygdala-damaged patients5 take
risky gambles more often than those without brain damage. Tison et al. (2012) also in-
vestigated the influence of health shocks on an individual’s preferences toward risk. They
found that some diseases do change people’s risk preferences. Basically, they showed that
cancer (as a threat to an individual’s life and reduced life expectancy) increases risk tol-
erance while diabetes (a long-term disease with daily treatment) increases risk aversion.
A question raised subsequently by the authors is whether the observed change in risk
aversion endures in the future or whether it is merely a temporary alteration of risk at-
titudes, in which case risk aversion would eventually return to the individuals initial level.
In this paper, we use the information on risk aversion provided by the Osaka Panel
Study. Like Sahm (2008), we investigate the existence and importance of a time-variant
component of risk aversion. We show that variations in individual risk aversion are related
to income and personal shocks. Sahm (2008) pointed out that a large proportion of
risk aversion differences comes from differences across individuals, which implies that the
time-variant component of risk preferences only plays a small role. We further investigate
this dimension by studying whether variation in risk aversion is reflected by a change in
individual risky behaviors. We find that risk aversion indeed contains both time-invariant
and time-variant factors. Time-variant factors are correlated with various changes such
5Amygdala is a part of the brain associated with emotional events.
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as income and age, which provides evidence that variations in risk aversion over time are
not just noise. That is why risk aversion measures collected back in time (more than five
years previously in our sample) do not predict current behavior well enough to see its
effect. We will discuss this in Section 4.
3 Methodology and Data
Time-invariant and time-variant components of risk aversion
Table 1 presents the factors involved in the different explanations of risk aversion. Ba-
sically, we decompose risk aversion into a time-invariant and a time-variant component.
Whereas the former may be determined by family background and early childhood ed-
ucation, the latter could be the result of shocks and experiences faced by individuals
over their lives. Ethnicity and gender are dictated by birth. It has been widely proven
that gender partially explains the difference in risk aversion (Croson and Gneezy (2009)
and Bertrand (2011)). There are two aspects that may explain why women are more
risk averse than men: (i) women are innately/inherently more risk averse than men at
birth, (ii) their socialization in the society in which they live makes them become more
risk averse. Furthermore, pre-adulthood, risk aversion may be influenced by family back-
ground, early childhood education and social norms. In other words, risk aversion can
be affected when individuals are building their identities and personalities. For example,
individuals raised in a conservative society tend to declare a higher level of risk aversion.
The samples used to measure risk aversion from surveys are generally made up of adults.
So in this case, the two factors that are innate characteristics and childhood socialization
can be treated as time-invariant factors. However, time-variant factors include socio-
demographic characteristics and shocks that can vary over time. Risk aversion varies
with age: the older an individual, the more risk averse (Tymula et al. (2013)). More-
over, when an unexpected negative event, such as a health shock (accident or disease)
or an income shock (job loss), happens to someone, this person might be expected to
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become more risk averse due to the experience of a negative situation affecting his initial
wealth (Kihlstrom et al. (1981)). In our paper, we discuss the formation of the risk aver-
sion function considering both time-variant and time-invariant factors. We then look at
which factor explains most of the risk-related behaviors.
Table 1: Factors Influencing the Different Dimensions of Risk Aversion
Time-invariant Time-variant
innate/physical social/early childhood
ethnicity family background socio-demographic characteristics
gender initial education - age/vocational training
- health status
- occupational characteristics
(seniority in a sector, job security level, type of wage)
shocks
- income/debt/loan/inheritance
- marriage/child birth/relative’s death
- labor/sector/occupation/unemployment
- social group, community, peer intervention
- health
Data
Our investigation into the instability of risk aversion uses data collected by the University
of Osaka, Ritsumeikan University, and Waseda University in Japan. This survey was
launched6 in order to study the influence of economic behavior on preferences and degrees
of life satisfaction. A representative sample was chosen by means of random sampling.
Detailed information was collected every year from 2003 to 2010 (eight waves).7
6This survey was launched by Yoshiro Tsutsui, University of Osaka.
7All municipalities were classed into ten areas (1.Hokkaido, 2.Touhoku, 3.Kantou, 4.Koushinetsu,
5.Hokuriku, 6.Toukai, 7.Kinki, 8.Chugoku, 9.Shikoku, and 10.Kyushu). In each area, the municipalities
were then divided into four categories corresponding to their population sizes (1.Seirei shitei toshi: A
city designated by government ordinance, 2. A city with 100 thousand people or more, 3. A city with
less than 100 thousand people, 4.A town or village). This gave a total of 40 strata. The number of
observations in an area was determined based on a 20-to-69-year-old population and city size.
- Sampling Spot Selection (First Sampling Unit)
1) The sampling unit for the first stage (FSU) was the census unit set up by the last census.
2) Sampling spots were distributed based on population (approximately 15 samples per spot).
3) The sampling interval was calculated within each stratum (total population in the stratum/ number
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The same individuals were interviewed face-to-face over this period, which means we
can control for unobserved heterogeneity using a panel dataset. In addition to extensive
socio-demographic data (age, gender, religion, marital status and education) and eco-
nomic information (occupational characteristics, income and consumption expenditure),
respondents were asked to provide data on risky choices in finance (assets, loans and
gambles) and health (exercise, smoking, drinking, height and weight). The survey also
included gambling or lottery questions to collect data on individual risk preferences. Un-
fortunately, the precise formulation of these gambling or lottery questions changed from
one survey wave to the next. Yet the formulation of the few self-reported risk aversion
questions remained the same from one year to another, such that we were able to use
them in our panel analysis.
Table 2 presents a simple descriptive statistics summary of respondents’ characteristics
for each wave. On average, we observe more women (over 50%) in the sample, and the
average age is around 50 years old. The panel is unbalanced as some individuals were
lost over the years and new participants were recruited in 2004, 2006 and 2009. Basically,
the oldest respondents drop out from the sample.8 The people in the sample have 1.3
children on average, and more than half of them are gainfully employed. More than
half of the Japanese people take part in some type of gambling9. More than half of the
of FSUs in the stratum). FSUs were determined by systematic sampling.
4) Each municipality in each stratum was ordered with a municipality code determined by government.
-Selection of Individuals
Some 15 observations were randomly sampled by systematic sampling in each spot (FSU). The sampling
interval varied by inhabitant list arrangement type.
-Selection of New Sampling Spots
Sampling spots, covering 4,600 new samples in the second survey (2003), were taken on a continuous
basis from the previous survey (first survey in 2002), and the remaining spots needed were selected by
the above method (First Sampling Unit)
-Use of Residential Map for Sampling in a Field
Quota sampling based on sex and age in each sampling spot was applied to the selection of 6,000 new
samples in the 2009 wave since the official inhabitant list was not available. The sampling spots were taken
on a continuous basis from the previous survey, and households were selected by systematic sampling
using a residential map.
8This explains why the average age does not increase between 2003 and 2004. In addition, more
male participants quit over the years through to 2008. In 2009, more men and more educated/employed
participants were newly recruited into the sample.
9The British Gambling Prevalence Survey found that 73% of the British adult population (aged 16
and over) participated in some form of gambling in 2009. This is equivalent to around 35.5 million adults.
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics: Yearly
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Female 0.511 0.527 0.531 0.529 0.534 0.541 0.530 0.532
(0.500) (0.499) (0.499) (0.499) (0.499) (0.498) (0.499) (0.499)
Age (in years) 49.14 49.07 50.07 50.23 51.44 52.70 49.96 51.23
(12.74) (12.97) (12.97) (13.11) (12.85) (12.66) (13.31) (13.15)
Education (in years) 12.60 12.67 12.67 12.73 12.77 12.78 13.02 13.07
(2.12) (2.14) (2.27) (2.29) (2.25) (2.25) (2.22) (2.20)
Income (in mil Yen) 3.49 3.56 3.69 3.73 3.79 3.81 3.73 3.84
(0.34) (0.35) (0.35) (0.34) (0.34) (0.33) (0.33) (0.32)
Married 0.760 0.774 0.791 0.786 0.795 0.805 0.786 0.798
(0.428) (0.419) (0.407) (0.410) (0.404) (0.396) (0.410) (0.402)
Children 1.252 1.294 1.326 1.324 1.375 1.411 1.386 1.436
(1.135) (1.094) (1.119) (1.146) (1.139) (1.119) (1.127) (1.144)
Working 0.561 0.576 0.573 0.583 0.582 0.575 0.673 0.647
(0.496) (0.494) (0.495) (0.493) (0.493) (0.494) (0.469) (0.478)
Gamble 0.571 0.605 0.624 0.586 0.606 0.592 0.605 0.703
(0.495) (0.489) (0.484) (0.493) (0.489) (0.491) (0.489) (0.457)
Smoke 0.345 0.316 0.306 0.288 0.276 0.254 0.260 0.244
(0.484) (0.476) (0.473) (0.463) (0.500) (0.500) (0.500) (0.500)
Drink 0.572 0.561 0.566 0.556 0.564 0.558 0.554 0.531
(0.408) (0.416) (0.415) (0.410) (0.402) (0.398) (0.401) (0.426)
Observations 1,418 4,224 2,987 3,763 3,112 2,731 6,181 5,386
New Entry 3,161 0 1,391 0 0 3,706 0
Quit 355 1,236 621 651 381 255 797
Notes: Standard Deviations in Parentheses. Annual Income is provided in millions of Yen.
sample (56%) reports that they drink, whereas the smoking rate is relatively low among
the interviewees (less than 35%).10 The data seem stable in terms of the individual
consistency of reporting. For example, 87% of the participants reported almost the same
height allowing 1cm difference every year. About 95% of the sample reported their height
within 2cm variance. Hence, we could rely on the yearly measures in this panel.
Table 3 presents a pairwise correlation matrix on the socio-demographic variables and
risk-related behaviors. Women are less likely to be employed as wage-earners, but rather
to be self-employed. All the following indicators are lower for women compared to men:
investment in risky assets, gambling, smoking and drinking habits. Family background
(father’s and mother’s education variables) is correlated with a number of choices: (i)
10The World Health Organizations 2005 Global Infobase reports that the Japanese smoking rate ranked
44th in the world (about 33.1%), behind Germany (35%) and France (34.1%), but higher than other
English-speaking countries (Australia 19.5%). However, the smoking rate declined worldwide in 2010:
France (23.3%), Germany (21.9%), United Kingdom (21.5%), and EU27 (23%).
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Table 3: Pairwise Correlation between Socio-Demographics and (Risky) Behaviors
Occupational Choices Financial Choices Risky Behaviors
Employed Public Self-Employed Debt Risky Asset Gamble Smoke Heavy Smoker Drink Heavy Drinker
Woman -0.343⋆ -0.002 0.056⋆ -0.016 -0.031⋆ -0.190⋆ -0.457⋆ -0.314⋆ -0.344⋆ -0.293⋆
Mother’s Edu 0.061⋆ 0.017 -0.110⋆ 0.043⋆ 0.029⋆ -0.051⋆ -0.055⋆ -0.056⋆ -0.002 -0.083⋆
Father’s Edu 0.009 0.037⋆ -0.106⋆ 0.002 0.060⋆ -0.044⋆ -0.061⋆ -0.066* -0.003 -0.076⋆
Education 0.125⋆ 0.174⋆ -0.181⋆ 0.050⋆ 0.094⋆ -0.034⋆ -0.027⋆ -0.061⋆ 0.087⋆ -0.042⋆
Age -0.229⋆ 0.032⋆ 0.243⋆ -0.245⋆ 0.172⋆ -0.013 0.010 -0.040⋆ -0.040⋆ 0.066⋆
Married -0.078⋆ 0.103⋆ 0.089⋆ 0.104⋆ 0.031⋆ 0.009 0.039⋆ -0.029⋆ 0.042⋆ 0.069⋆
Have Children -0.090⋆ 0.073⋆ 0.099⋆ 0.092⋆ 0.029⋆ 0.005 0.025⋆ -0.032⋆ -0.003 0.066⋆
Note: ⋆ 5% significance.
parents’ education raises employment and reduces self-employment, (ii) it is positively
correlated with debts and investment in risky assets,11 and (iii) it is negatively correlated
with the childrens gambling, smoking, and drinking behavior. Education per se has a
similar impact as the parents’ education: it is positively correlated with employment,
and negatively correlated with self-employment. A wealth effect seems to run through
both parental and personal education: they are both correlated positively with financial
choices. In addition, people with higher education tend to gamble and smoke less, whereas
they tend to drink more. Yet, if we look at the heavy drinkers, this factor is negatively
correlated with education, suggesting that more highly educated people do drink more
often, but moderately. Lastly, people are both less employed and less employable as they
get older, leading to more self-employment.
4 Empirical analysis
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the stability of risk aversion over time in order
to derive recommendations for survey data collection. In particular, our analysis provides
evidence in favor of a periodic collection of risk aversion, rather than systematically or
solely at baseline.
The empirical analysis starts with evidence on the validity of our preferred risk aver-
sion measure: self-assessment of own risk aversion. We then provide proof that risk
11However, the correlation with financial choices is due mainly to the wealth effect as more education
in turn increases wealth.
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aversion is made up of a time-variant part, and show that the variation cannot amount
to measurement error or noise given that it is related to income and health shocks. Lastly,
we investigate whether or not the variation in risk aversion finds expression in a change
in individuals’ risky behavior.
4.1 Validity of our risk aversion measure
There is much discussion of risk aversion measurement in the literature and many different
methodologies have been proposed. At the core of choices made by survey designers is a
trade-off between measurement accuracy and data collection practicality.
Many different methodologies widely used in the literature have been taken up for
the Osaka Panel Data: self-reported risk aversion in general, income prospect choices,
lotteries, and the “taking an umbrella” question. Unfortunately, the formulation of some
of these questions varies from one year to the next, preventing us from making use of this
wide range of measures. Self-reported risk aversion is actually one of the few methods that
remains the same across all the questionnaires. Dohmen et al. (2010) and Hardeweg et al.
(2012) draw on German and Thai data to show that survey data outperform experimental
measures, such as real pay-out lotteries, when it comes to predicting risky behaviors. In
addition to the previous evidence in favor of this type of risk aversion measure, we show
below that measures of individual risk aversion are actually highly correlated with one
another.
In this section, we present the different methodologies used in the Osaka Panel Study.
Three main methodologies are actually used: (i) income prospect choices (Barsky et al.,
1997), (ii) willingness to pay for lottery tickets, and (iii) self-reported risk aversion. With
the exception of the self-reported risk aversion measure, some of the risk aversion ques-
tions vary somewhat across survey waves. While the wording remains the same in most
cases, the probabilities and amounts offered differ. Below, we report the questions used
in the 2006 wave.
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Barsky et al. (1997)’s measure
This first measure is based on hypothetical choices between betting on doubling current
income with some risk of having it cut by a certain percentage or benefiting from a small,
but constant increase in current income.
Respondents were asked two sets of questions along these lines. We present one of
them below. The other one differs merely by the size of the income loss.
1. “In which of the following two ways would you prefer to receive your monthly in-
come? Assume that your job assignment is the same for each scenario.”
(a) Your monthly income has a 50% chance of doubling, but also has 50% chance
of decreasing by 30% → answer question 2.
(b) Your monthly income is guaranteed to increase by 5% → answer question 3.
2. “Of the following two jobs, which would you prefer?”
(a) Your monthly income has a 50% chance of doubling, but also has 50% chance
of decreasing by 50%
(b) Your monthly income is guaranteed to increase by 5%
3. “Of the following two jobs, which would you prefer?”
(a) Your monthly income has a 50% chance of doubling, but also has 50% chance
of decreasing by 10%
(b) Your monthly income is guaranteed to increase by 5%
The answers given by participants are classed in four different groups. A four-category
variable of risk aversion can thus be built. The latter is increasing with risk aversion and
takes the following values: 1 if the respondent answered (a) to question 1 and (a) to
question 2; 2 if he answered (a) to question 1, but (b) to question 2; 3 if he answered (b)
to question 1 and (a) to question 3, and finally 4 if he answered (b) to both questions 1
and 3.
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Reservation prices
The second methodology used to derive individuals’ preferences towards risk draws on
an individual’s willingness to pay for a lottery ticket.
Respondents were asked three sets of questions along these lines. We present one
of them below. The second one differs by the percentage chance of winning the lottery
(1%) and the gain (100,000 yen). The third is based on the same lottery as the first
set of questions, but the individual is now in the position of selling the ticket instead of
purchasing it.
1. “Let’s assume there is a lottery with a 50% chance of winning 2,000 yen and a
50% chance of winning nothing. If the lottery ticket is sold for 200 yen, would you
purchase a ticket?”
(a) I would purchase a ticket → answer question 2
(b) I wouldn’t purchase a ticket → answer question 3
2. “What is the most you would pay to purchase the lottery ticket mentioned in question
1?”
(a) Purchase if the price is less than 300 yen
(b) Purchase if the price is less than 400 yen
(c) Purchase if the price is less than 600 yen
(d) Purchase if the price is less than 1,000 yen
(e) Purchase if the price is less than 2,000 yen
(f) Purchase even if the price is more than 2,000 yen
3. “If the price of the lottery ticket was lowered, would you purchase it if...”
(a) The price is less than 190 yen
(b) The price is less than 150 yen
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(c) The price is less than 100 yen
(d) The price is less than 50 yen
(e) The price is less than 1 yen
(f) Wouldn’t purchase even if the price is 1 yen
Based on the answers provided, all respondents can be classed by their level of risk
aversion in a 12-category variable that is increasing with risk aversion. This variable
takes value 1 for the participants who replied (a) to question 1 and (f) to question 2, and
value 12 for individuals who said they would not purchase such a ticket even if the price
were only 1 yen (i.e. option (b) in question 1 and option (f) in question 3).
Self-reported risk aversion
Eleven-ladder Likert scales were used in the three risk aversion questions. The formula-
tions used are reported hereafter. All the scales have been reversed in order to obtain
variables that are increasing with risk aversion.
The “wise man” question - self-reported risk aversion in general “As the
proverb says, “Nothing ventured, nothing gained”, there is a way of thinking that in
order to achieve results, you need to take risks. On the other hand, as another proverb
says, “A wise man never courts danger”, meaning that you should avoid risks as much as
possible. Which way of thinking is closest to the way you think? On a scale of 0-10, with
10 being completely in agreement with the thinking “Nothing ventured, nothing gained”,
and 0 being completely in agreement with the thinking “A wise man never courts danger”,
please rate your behavioral pattern.”
The “cautiousness” question “When you usually go out, are you cautious of locking
doors/windows and turning off appliances to prevent a fire? On a scale of 0-10 with 10
being the “last person to be cautious”, and 0 being the “most cautious”, please rate your
level of cautiousness.”
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The “umbrella” question “When you usually go out, how high does the probability
of rain have to be before you take an umbrella?”
Table 4: Pairwise Correlation between Different Risk-Aversion Measures
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Barsky RA measures
inc. prospect choice #1 (1) 1.000
inc. prospect choice #2 (2) 0.636⋆⋆⋆ 1.000
Lotteries
RA lottery #1 (3) 0.118⋆⋆⋆ 0.120⋆⋆⋆ 1.000
RA lottery #2 (4) 0.107⋆⋆⋆ 0.163⋆⋆⋆ 0.587⋆⋆⋆ 1.000
Self-declared risk aversion
SRRA in general (5) 0.135⋆⋆⋆ 0.085⋆⋆⋆ 0.129⋆⋆⋆ 0.1409⋆⋆⋆ 1.000
caution (6) 0.030 0.024 0.046⋆⋆ 0.051⋆⋆ 0.1725⋆⋆⋆ 1.000
umbrella question (7) 0.059⋆⋆ 0.041⋆ 0.042⋆ 0.013 0.089⋆⋆⋆ 0.089⋆⋆⋆ 1.000
Notes: ⋆⋆⋆ 1%, ⋆⋆ 5% and ⋆ 10% significance.
Table 4 reports the pairwise correlations between different types of risk aversion mea-
sures. We could compare the three different measures of risk aversion. All the described
measures increase with risk aversion: a more risk-averse individual gets a higher value for
each variable. All methods are significantly and positively correlated with one another.
From Table 4, we note that the variable for self-reported risk aversion (SRRA hereafter)
in general is positively correlated with all the other measures. Based on this observation
and given the formulation issues we face with the other methodologies, we use SRRA as
a good proxy for individuals’ preferences towards risk in our study.
Table 5: Pairwise Correlation between Risk Aversion and Socio-Demographics
Woman Mother’s Edu Father’s Edu Education Age Married Have Children
SRRA in general 0.116⋆ -0.070⋆ -0.055⋆ -0.064⋆ 0.098⋆ -0.059⋆ 0.045⋆
expected sign + - - - + ? +
Notes: ⋆ 5% significance.
From Table 5, we note that self-declared risk aversion is positively correlated with
being a woman, being older and having children. It is negatively correlated with own
education, parents’ education and being married. All these results are in line with the
existing literature.12
12However, education could be an endogenous choice, which could also be affected by the agent’s risk
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Table 6: Pairwise Correlation between Current Risk Aversion and (Risky) Behaviors
SRRA in general expected sign
occupational choices
employed -0.136⋆ -
public sector 0.0194 +
self-employed -0.019 -
financial choices
debt -0.038⋆ -
risky asset -0.080⋆ -
risky behaviors
gamble -0.101⋆ -
smoke -0.127⋆ -
heavy smoker -0.093⋆ -
drink -0.092⋆ -
heavy drinker -0.044⋆ -
Note: ⋆ 5% significance.
Table 6 presents the pairwise correlations between current self-reported risk aversion
and risky behaviors. All our results are consistent with the expected sign. Basically, self-
assessed risk aversion is negatively correlated with health-related risky behaviors (such
as smoking and drinking) and financial choices (such as debt and holding risky assets).
Regarding occupational choices, the expected positive relation between public sector and
risk aversion, on one side, and the negative association between risk aversion and self-
employment, on the other side, are found but are not significant at the standard 5%
level.
In view of these simple correlations between our risk aversion measures, socio-demographics
and risky behaviors, it would appear that the self-assessed risk aversion variable is corre-
lated with socio-demographics with the expected sign and capturing individual behavior
well. We thus retain this measure for the core of our analysis.
aversion level and the level of education of his parents.
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4.2 Variation of risk aversion over time
Unlike many panel surveys that collect risk aversion information at baseline only, Osaka
University Panel Data respondents were asked questions about their risk aversion every
year. This feature of our data enables us to investigate the stability of individuals’
responses over time.
Figure 1: Variation of Declared Risk Aversion : One Year Lag ∆RA = RAt −RAt−1
Figure 2: Variation of Declared Risk Aversion : Two Years Lag ∆RA = RAt −RAt−2
Figures 1, 2, 3 and 4 display yearly, two-year, three-year and five-year variations in
individual self-declared risk aversion. The solid line displays the 0 value, which represents
‘no change’ in risk aversion compared to the previous year. The dashed line shows the
median value of change.13
13If RAt = 4 and RAt−1 = 4 then ∆RAt = 0. If RAt = 5 and RAt−1 = 4 then ∆RAt = 1. Therefore,
a positive number means that s/he is now more risk averse compared to last year’s risk-aversion level.
18
Figure 3: Variation of Declared Risk Aversion : Three Years Lag ∆RA = RAt −RAt−3
Figure 4: Variation of Declared Risk Aversion : Five Years Lag ∆RA = RAt −RAt−5
While no variation in risk aversion level is observed for most of the respondents, around
30% of interviewees report a higher or lower level of risk aversion. Almost all years present
a clear bell-shaped distribution with a median of 0, but also many interviewees reporting
different risk aversion levels across the years. Nonetheless, in the first two graphs of figure
1, which present the variation in individuals’ risk preferences between 2003 and 2004 and
between 2004 and 2005 respectively, the median risk aversion change is different from 0,
and it is first left- and then right-shifted. So it seems that something unusual happened
in 2004: people posted lower risk aversion on average in 2004.
Let us denote ∆ the difference in index between year t and year t − 1. As self-
reported risk aversion has a 0-10 scale, the possible range of difference in risk aversion is
from −10 to 10. The former value corresponds to an extreme risk-averse agent (SRRA =
10) becoming an extreme risk lover (SRRA = 0), while the latter value can be associated
with an extreme risk-seeking individual who becomes extremely risk averse. ∆+ is a
dummy for becoming more risk averse: an individual declares a higher risk aversion score
at year t compared to year t − 1. ∆− is a dummy for becoming less risk averse: an
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individual declares a lower level of risk aversion at year t compared to year t− 1. These
two dummies take value 1 only when the difference in the annual risk aversion index is
greater than or equal to 2 in order to avoid respondent measurement error noise. Table
7 reports the share of individuals who declare a different level of risk aversion from one
year to the next.14 Leaving aside 2003-2004 and 2004-2005, we note that around 15%
and 20% of respondents declare a higher level of risk aversion than the previous year, and
a similar share of the sample declare a lower level of risk aversion than in the previous
survey wave.
Table 7: Yearly Change in Individuals’ Self-Reported Risk Aversion
% 03-04 04-05 05-06 06-07 07-08 08-09 09-10
Share of individuals
with higher RA (∆+) 8.74 60.29 19.13 19.31 16.75 20.37 16.33
with lower RA (∆−) 52.83 7.40 19.13 17.77 20.04 14.00 20.89
Observations 1,041 2,946 2,332 3,045 2,674 2,415 5,247
Note: 2004 refers to the variation between 2003 and 2004.
These figures provide some initial evidence that individual risk aversion may vary over
time, which is at odds with the risk stability assumption commonly used. To confirm that
the observed instability is really capturing actual changes in individual characteristics and
not just measurement error, we investigate the relation between the yearly changes in self-
declared risk aversion and shocks (such as job loss, income changes and health optimism)
faced by individuals in the previous year. Such shocks could actually explain the change
in declared risk aversion from one year to the next.
4.3 Is the variation in risk aversion correlated with shocks?
Table 8 presents the pairwise correlation matrix for changes in risk aversion and shocks.
We compare changes in self-reported risk aversion with various shocks. As previously,
∆ stands for the difference in the index between year t and t − 1. Job loss is a dummy
14We only look at the variations for participants who stay two years in a row. That is why the number
of observations is less than the full sample size. In 2004, for example, we could only observe 1, 041
participants who were in the 2003 wave even though the total 2004 sample size was 4,224.
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variable created if the individual, his spouse, or both have lost their job between year t
and t−1. As health variables are collected as index variables15, we also created dummies
for positive/negative changes. Personal job loss is not really significant to the SRRA,
but spouse job loss is. When a spouse has lost his or her job (or both have lost their
jobs), the individual declares a higher risk aversion level. When individuals are more
anxious about their health, they also declare a higher risk aversion level. When it comes
to income variation, we can observe a significant correlation between difference in income
and change in SRRA. If the individual earns more income compared to the previous
year, s/he becomes less risk averse, which is consistent with the wealth effect in the risk
aversion literature. We then look at the sub-sample analyses between men and women.
Men become more risk averse when they lose their own job, whereas women are more
influenced by their spouses job loss. Moreover, women are more sensitive to an income
change: if they become richer, they are less risk averse, while men are not influenced
very much by an income change. In order to see the clearer correlation and even the
underlying causation, we conduct the Mundlak random-effects model.
Table 8: Pairwise Correlation between Changes in Risk aversion and Shocks
SRRA job loss health Income
in general own spouse both ∆+ ∆− ∆
∆ 0.006 0.023⋆⋆ 0.019⋆⋆ 0.442⋆⋆⋆ 0.000 -0.014⋆
∆m 0.020⋆⋆⋆ 0.016 0.032⋆⋆ 0.358⋆⋆⋆ 0.037⋆ -0.002
∆f -0.005 0.024⋆ 0.011 0.363⋆⋆ -0.006 0.039⋆
Notes: ⋆ 10%, ⋆⋆ 5% and ⋆⋆⋆ 1% significance.
∆+ refers to a positive change, ∆− refers to a negative change.
Positive change means that the individual becomes more risk averse.
∆m refers to changes for male respondents only, ∆f for female respondents only.
15A question regarding health status is asked: “Are you anxious about your health?”. Respondents
answered on a scale of 1 (absolutely agree) to 5 (do not agree at all).
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4.4 Does the time-variant dimension represent a large share of
risk aversion?
We first estimate the regression on the yearly change in risk aversion with shocks. As
seen above, the change in risk aversion is correlated with income, health, and employment
shocks. In addition, we control for changes in debt, marital status, having a child, and
education. For the analyses, we introduce regional and year dummies in consideration of
the Japanese earthquakes.16
Table 9 presents the result of delta-delta regression. Column (1) shows the estimates
for the pooled OLS, and Column (2) presents the random effect model, followed by
Column (3) with the fixed effect model. The yearly change in log income is negatively
correlated with the change in risk aversion; the richer the individual, the less risk averse
s/he becomes. Being more anxious about health also raises the risk aversion level, while
being less anxious about health is relatively less clear (but has the negative sign for
the fixed effect model). Those in their early 20s might change their education level.
The change in education level is negatively correlated with the change in risk aversion;
the more educated an individual, the less risk averse s/he becomes. This result could
suggest that higher education (tertiary education) may reduce the risk aversion level.
The concern is that there are not enough yearly changes to capture the correlations
between the changes in risk aversion and other shocks, as the sample size is small and
the panel is relatively short. We therefore use another method, the ‘Mundlak model’, to
capture the time-variant and time-invariant factors in the following section.
16In 2003-2010, there were three regional earthquakes causing more than ten casualties. The Chuetsu
earthquake occurred on October 23, 2004, causing 40 casualties in the Tohoku, Hokuriku, and Kanto
regions. On July 16, 2007, another Chuetsu offshore earthquake occurred with 11 casualties in the
Hokuriku region. More recently, in the Touhoku region, the Iwate-Miyagi Nairiku earthquake (June
14, 2008) caused 12 casualties. We first control for those who were in the regions affected by these
earthquakes at the time by introducing dummies one year after the earthquakes. However, as we control
for the regions and year, the specific regions in the specific year do not give rise to any significant impact
on the yearly change in individual risk aversion.
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Table 9: Delta - Delta Regression on Yearly Changes
Dependent Variable = ∆SRRA
(1) (2) (3)
Pooled OLS Random Effect Fixed Effect
∆Log(Income) -0.138 -0.138 -0.226
(0.09) (0.09) (0.13)
Age 0.003 0.003 0.001
(0.00) (0.00) (0.23)
∆Health+ (=1) 0.134 0.134 0.180
(0.10) (0.10) (0.15)
∆Health− (=1) 0.139 0.139 0.058
(0.10) (0.10) (0.15)
Job Loss Self (=1) -0.147 -0.147 -0.320
(0.23) (0.23) (0.37)
Job Loss Spouse (=1) -0.709** -0.709** -1.048*
(0.24) (0.27) (0.43)
Job Loss Both (=1) 1.041* 1.041* 0.930
(0.46) (0.51) (0.82)
∆Debt 0.042 0.042 0.014
(0.13) (0.12) (0.18)
∆Marital Status -0.146 -0.146 1.404
(0.44) (0.54) (1.26)
∆Number of Children -0.054 -0.054 -0.031
(0.11) (0.11) (0.14)
∆Education -0.137 -0.137 -0.282
(0.12) (0.11) (0.15)
Female (=1) 0.165* 0.165*
(0.07) (0.08)
Constant -0.453 -0.070 -2.300
(0.28) (0.32) (11.51)
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes
Region Dummy Yes Yes Yes
City Dummy Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2642 2642 2642
R2 within 0.202 0.207
R2 overall 0.207 0.183
R2 between 0.207 0.156
R2 0.207 0.207
Notes: ⋆ 10%, ⋆⋆ 5% and ⋆⋆⋆ 1% significance.
Standard errors are clustered at the individual level.
Correlated Random Effects (Mundlak, 1978) We build a statistical model in
keeping with Sahm (2008), which formulates the risk aversion function RAit = xitβ + ai
to disentangle the time-variant factors xit and the time-invariant factors ai. We can
model the relationship between time-invariant factor ai and the observable panel average
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x¯i as ai = x¯iλ+ ui. We assume ui|x¯i ∼ N(0, σ
2
u). This approach takes up the correlated
random-effects model by Mundlak (1978). Also, given that our self-reported risk aversion
measure is on a scale of 0 to10, we can assign a latent variable such that:
RAit = xitβ + x¯iλ+ ui + ǫit
SRRAit = j, if RAj < RAit < RAj (i = 1, ..., N ; t = 1, ...T )
SRRAit is the self-reported category reported by an interviewee. By rearranging the
above equation, we can exhibit the within- and between-individual variations in the risk
aversion function.
RAit = (xit − x¯i)β + x¯i(λ+ β) + ui + ǫit (1)
RAit: Self-Reported Risk Aversion Category at time t of individual i
xit − x¯i: Income variation, Age variation, Health shock, Employment variation, Debt Varia-
tion, Marital change, Change in the number of children, Employment status change,
and Education variation
x¯i: Panel average of Log income, Age, Health, Employment, Debt, Marital status,
Number of children, and Number of years of schooling
We test the impact of the panel average of time-variant variables for the same in-
dividual in order to track the between-subject effect and the impact of the current
variation (difference between the current variable and the panel average) to check the
within-individual effect on the risk aversion parameter. To be more precise, the first
term (xit − x¯i)β captures a change in the risk aversion parameter for a given individual
(within-individual variation) and the second term x¯i(λ+ β) gives the between-individual
variation. We use the random-effects regression to estimate the parameters.
Table 10 presents the result of the within-between analyses. The result across in-
dividuals (between-individual variation) shows that women declare higher self-reported
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risk aversion, as expected. Also, being employed is negatively correlated with the risk
aversion measure.17
Table 10: Risk Aversion with Within and Between Variations : Mundlak Model
Dependent Variable = Log(SRRA)
(1) (2) (1) (2)
Pooled OLS Random Effect Pooled OLS Random Effect
Within Variation Between Variation
Variation Log(Income) -0.043*** -0.037*** Mean Log(Income) -0.011 -0.026
(0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.04)
Variation Age -0.006 -0.006 Mean Age 0.003*** 0.003***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Variation Health Status 0.006 0.006 Mean Health Status 0.036*** 0.030***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Variation Employment Status Self (=1) -0.017 -0.007 Mean Employment Self -0.076*** -0.066**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Variation Employment Status Spouse (=1) -0.016 -0.011 Mean Employment Spouse 0.095*** 0.081***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Variation Debt 0.002 -0.002 Mean Debt -0.009 -0.006
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Variation Marital Status 0.009 0.011 Mean Marital Status -0.066* -0.060*
(0.07) (0.06) (0.03) (0.03)
Variation Number of Children -0.008 -0.009 Mean Number of Children -0.017** -0.013*
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Variation Education -0.032 -0.023 Mean Education -0.020** -0.019**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Constant 1.157* 1.950*** Female (=1) 0.039** 0.049***
(0.58) (0.56) (0.01) (0.01)
Year Dummy Yes Yes
Region Dummy Yes Yes
City Dummy Yes Yes
Observations 8400 8400
R2 within 0.278
R2 overall 0.214
R2 between 0.175
R2 0.215
Notes: ⋆ 10%, ⋆⋆ 5% and ⋆⋆⋆ 1% significance.
Standard errors are clustered at the individual level.
Mean Variable is the panel average for one individual.
Variable Variation is the difference between current value and panel average.
Column (1) presents the pooled OLS on log of self-reported risk aversion and Column
(2) presents the random effect model on log of self-reported risk aversion.18 The risk
aversion measure shows that individuals become less risk averse when they get richer,
as the log income variation is negatively correlated with the risk aversion measure with
strong significance. On the other hand, age variation is positively correlated with risk
aversion, meaning that when an individual gets older, s/he becomes more risk averse. If
either the individual or the spouse loses his or her job, then s/he becomes more risk averse
17Employment status: being unemployed takes the value of 0, and being employed takes the value of
1.
18Using a logarithm means that we can obtain the percentage change in risk aversion associated with
the different variables. An income change lowers risk aversion by 3.6% - 4.3% , whereas getting one year
older increases risk aversion by 0.6%. Also, being a woman increases risk aversion by 3.9% - 4.9% and
being anxious about health status significantly raises the risk aversion measure by 3.1% - 3.7%.
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(negative correlation with a positive employment status change). Where the individual
gets a higher education (tertiary education), s/he becomes less risk averse (negative
correlation).19 However, these latter relations are not statistically significant. Across
individuals, women and older people are more risk averse, as expected.20 Those who have
concerns about their health status tend to declare a higher risk aversion level. Education
is negatively correlated with risk aversion, and those who are indebted are less risk averse,
and vice versa, i.e. risk-averse individuals do not like debt. Married individuals declare
lower risk aversion.
Robustness Checks We observe a big shift in Risk Aversion between 2003 and 2004,
raising a measurement error concern. We therefore conduct the robustness checks for
our analyses without the years 2003 and 2004. Table 11 presents the result of a delta-
delta regression excluding 2003 and 2004. It does not find a large difference compared to
Table 9 except that now the change in income in the fixed effect model gives significant
effect. Table 12 presents the Mundlak model excluding the years 2003-2004. The result
shows that the income and education variations reduce the risk aversion level, with slight
changes in the coefficients. Therefore, we can safely say that the income change is indeed
negatively correlated with risk aversion in terms of within-individual variation. Across
individuals, the richer, healthier and employed men are less risk averse.
19We have individuals aged 20-25 to be able to capture the changes in education. In Japan, individuals
attend higher education in their early-to-mid 20s.
20We look solely at correlation, not causality in terms of the ‘between variation’ here.
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Table 11: Delta - Delta Regression on Yearly Changes, 2005-2010
Dependent Variable = ∆SRRA
(1) (2) (3)
Pooled OLS Random Effect Fixed Effect
∆Log(Income) -0.161 -0.161 -0.251*
(0.10) (0.09) (0.13)
Age 0.001 0.001 0.003
(0.00) (0.00) (0.24)
∆Health+ (=1) 0.157 0.157 0.233
(0.10) (0.10) (0.15)
∆Health− (=1) 0.144 0.144 0.058
(0.10) (0.10) (0.15)
Job Loss Self (=1) -0.141 -0.141 -0.336
(0.24) (0.23) (0.37)
Job Loss Spouse (=1) -0.644** -0.644* -0.928*
(0.25) (0.27) (0.44)
Job Loss Both (=1) 1.047* 1.047* 1.005
(0.46) (0.51) (0.82)
∆Debt 0.040 0.040 0.100
(0.14) (0.12) (0.18)
∆Marital Status 0.039 0.039 1.311
(0.40) (0.55) (1.22)
∆Child -0.125 -0.125 -0.096
(0.11) (0.11) (0.14)
∆Education -0.122 -0.122 -0.266
(0.13) (0.11) (0.15)
Female (=1) 0.213** 0.213*
(0.07) (0.08)
Constant 1.978*** -0.119 -0.527
(0.31) (0.32) (12.82)
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes
Region Dummy Yes Yes Yes
City Dummy Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2515 2515 2515
R2 within 0.181 0.187
R2 overall 0.176 0.146
R2 between 0.162 0.110
R2 0.176 0.187
Notes: ⋆ 10%, ⋆⋆ 5% and ⋆⋆⋆ 1% significance.
Standard errors are clustered at the individual level.
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Table 12: Risk Aversion with Within and Between Variations : Mundlak Model, 2005-
2010
Dependent Variable = Log(SRRA)
(1) (2) (1) (2)
Pooled OLS Random Effect Pooled OLS Random Effect
Within Variation Between Variation
Log(Income) -0.034*** -0.034*** Mean Log(Income) -0.024 -0.059
(0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.04)
Age -0.010* -0.010* Mean Age 0.003*** 0.003***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Health Status 0.003 0.001 Mean Health Status 0.025*** 0.019**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Employment Status Self (=1) -0.008 0.003 Mean Employment Self -0.085*** -0.069**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Employment Status Spouse (=1) -0.006 0.001 Mean Employment Spouse 0.104*** 0.089***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Debt 0.003 0.006 Mean Debt -0.028* -0.022
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Marital Status -0.026 -0.026 Mean Marital Status -0.037 -0.024
(0.08) (0.07) (0.03) (0.03)
Child -0.014 -0.018 Mean Number of Children -0.019** -0.014*
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Education -0.043* -0.038* Mean Education -0.013* -0.011
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Constant 1.839** 2.409*** Female (=1) 0.070*** 0.073***
(0.62) (0.58) (0.02) (0.01)
Year Dummy Yes Yes
Region Dummy Yes Yes
City Dummy Yes Yes
Observations 7235 7235
R2 within 0.007
R2 overall 0.057
R2 between 0.060
R2 0.058
Notes: ⋆ 10%, ⋆⋆ 5% and ⋆⋆⋆ 1% significance.
Standard errors are clustered at the individual level.
Mean Variable is the panel average for one individual.
Variable Variation is the difference between current value and panel average.
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4.5 How often should risk attitudes be collected in surveys?
Table 13 and Table 14 present the coefficients of self-reported risk aversion when predict-
ing current risky behaviors without and with socio-demographic controls, respectively.
Current risky behaviors are smoking, drinking, gambling, investment in risky assets, in-
debtedness, employment status, self-employment, and public sector choice. Risk aversion
is negatively correlated with all the given behaviors: risk-averse individuals smoke less,
drink less, gamble less, invest less in risky assets, have less debt, and fewer of them are
self-employed. Using the past lagged risk aversion measures turns up fairly similar results
when predicting current behaviors compared to the current risk aversion measure.
Table 13: Analyses with Past Risk-Aversion Variables on Current Behaviors
Probit estimations without controls Self Public
Smoke Drink Gamble Risky asset Debt Employed employed sector
RAt -0.080
⋆⋆⋆ -0.065⋆⋆⋆ -0.071⋆⋆⋆ -0.043⋆⋆⋆ -0.032⋆⋆⋆ -0.079⋆⋆⋆ 0.003 0.016
Clustered SE (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.011)
Pseudo R2 0.012 0.008 0.009 0.003 0.002 0.011 0.000 0.001
observations 23,847 23,847 23,847 8,597 23,047 22,975 14,210 11,033
RAt−1 -0.081
⋆⋆⋆ -0.062⋆⋆⋆ -0.065⋆⋆⋆ -0.032⋆⋆⋆ -0.033⋆⋆⋆ -0.076⋆⋆⋆ 0.001 0.011
Clustered SE (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.013)
Pseudo R2 0.012 0.007 0.008 0.002 0.002 0.011 0.000 0.000
observations 15,870 15,870 15,870 6,274 15,394 15,271 9,421 7,250
RAt−2 -0.086
⋆⋆⋆ -0.061⋆⋆⋆ -0.067⋆⋆⋆ -0.016 -0.037⋆⋆⋆ -0.076⋆⋆⋆ 0.012 0.006
Clustered SE (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.013) (0.009) (0.009) (0.013) (0.017)
Pseudo R2 0.013 0.007 0.008 0.000 0.002 0.010 0.000 0.000
observations 9,476 9,476 9,476 3,215 9,183 9,075 5,558 4,246
RAt−3 -0.078
⋆⋆⋆ -0.053⋆⋆⋆ -0.062⋆⋆⋆ -0.018 -0.034⋆⋆⋆ -0.075⋆⋆⋆ 0.012 0.001
Clustered SE (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.016) (0.010) (0.010) (0.014) (0.018)
Pseudo R2 0.011 0.006 0.007 0.001 0.002 0.011 0.000 0.000
observations 6,560 6,560 6,560 1,733 6,350 6,235 3,930 3,015
RAt−4 -0.085
⋆⋆⋆ -0.062⋆⋆⋆ -0.057⋆⋆⋆ -0.011 -0.029⋆ -0.056⋆⋆⋆ -0.000 0.012
Clustered SE (0.011) (0.013) (0.011) (0.015) (0.011) (0.012) (0.016) (0.020)
Pseudo R2 0.013 0.008 0.006 0.000 0.002 0.006 0.000 0.000
observations 3,962 3,962 3,962 1,738 3,840 3,732 2,418 1,874
RAt−5 -0.072
⋆⋆⋆ -0.067⋆⋆⋆ -0.052⋆⋆ -0.016 -0.019 -0.031 -0.026 -0.001
Clustered SE (0.016) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.016) (0.017) (0.024) (0.030)
Pseudo R2 0.009 0.009 0.005 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.000
observations 1,576 1,576 1,576 1,198 1,536 1,494 930 722
Notes: ⋆ 10%, ⋆⋆ 5% and ⋆⋆⋆ 1% significance.
Similarly, Tables 15 and 16 present the coefficients of the different average measures of
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Table 14: Analyses with Past Risk-Aversion Variables on Current Behaviors
Probit estimations with controls Self Public
Smoke Drink Gamble Risky asset Debt Employed employed sector
RAt -0.034
⋆⋆⋆ -0.041⋆⋆⋆ -0.055⋆⋆⋆ -0.041⋆⋆⋆ -0.017⋆ -0.042⋆⋆⋆ -0.009 0.017
Clustered SE (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.013)
Pseudo R2 0.195 0.082 0.046 0.068 0.092 0.177 0.075 0.047
observations 17,436 17,436 17,436 6,622 17,139 16,829 10,170 7,688
RAt−1 -0.031
⋆⋆⋆ -0.038⋆⋆⋆ -0.044⋆⋆⋆ -0.036⋆⋆⋆ -0.016 -0.033⋆⋆⋆ -0.016 0.015
Clustered SE (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.009) (0.012) (0.016)
Pseudo R2 0.217 0.082 0.047 0.068 0.101 0.172 0.076 0.044
observations 11,862 11,862 11,862 4,885 11,682 11,436 6,872 5,147
RAt−2 -0.030
⋆⋆ -0.037⋆⋆ -0.053⋆⋆⋆ -0.010 -0.022⋆ -0.037⋆⋆⋆ -0.007 0.010
Clustered SE (0.012) (0.012) (0.010) (0.015) (0.011) (0.011) (0.015) (0.020)
Pseudo R2 0.257 0.079 0.047 0.065 0.107 0.164 0.070 0.044
observations 7,192 7,192 7,192 2,576 7,075 6,906 4,126 3,068
RAt−3 -0.024 -0.032
⋆ -0.046⋆⋆⋆ -0.021 -0.021 -0.036⋆⋆ -0.013 0.007
Clustered SE (0.013) (0.013) (0.011) (0.018) (0.012) (0.012) (0.017) (0.022)
Pseudo R2 0.260 0.081 0.050 0.063 0.115 0.155 0.066 0.048
observations 5,019 5,019 5,019 1,393 4,930 4,775 2,949 2,213
RAt−4 -0.037
⋆⋆ -0.040⋆⋆ -0.043⋆⋆ -0.003 -0.015 -0.019 -0.023 0.022
Clustered SE (0.014) (0.015) (0.013) (0.018) (0.014) (0.015) (0.019) (0.024)
Pseudo R2 0.269 0.084 0.063 0.062 0.117 0.170 0.064 0.053
observations 3,050 3,050 3,050 1,397 2,995 2,871 1,845 1,402
RAt−5 -0.048
⋆ -0.055⋆⋆ -0.026 -0.006 -0.026 -0.026 -0.066⋆ -0.014
Clustered SE (0.020) (0.021) (0.020) (0.021) (0.019) (0.021) (0.028) (0.034)
Pseudo R2 0.261 0.101 0.103 0.062 0.114 0.167 0.081 0.064
observations 1,237 1,237 1,237 978 1,217 1,172 730 555
Notes: ⋆ 10%, ⋆⋆ 5% and ⋆⋆⋆ 1% significance.
Control variables are gender, age, education, mother’s education, marital status and number of children.
risk aversion when predicting current risky behaviors.21 The first two rows of each table
present the total average risk aversion measures: the first is panel average risk aversion
over time including the current risk aversion measure, while the second excludes current
risk aversion. From the third row, we calculate the average of current risk aversion at t
and the past risk aversion measure at t− i where i = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6.
Tables 17 - Table 22 show the results for the sample of individuals who appear four,
five and six consecutive years. A comparison of the pseudo R2 and coefficient size shows
that a four-year average provides a better prediction than the other two-year averages of
risk aversion. This suggests that having more information on the time-variant dimensions
of the risk aversion measure can increase explanatory power and decrease measurement
noise. In addition, current behavior is more related to the recent risk aversion measures,
21We dropped years 2003 and 2004 in this section due to the abovementioned measurement concerns
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Table 15: Analyses with Average Risk-Aversion Variables on Current Behaviors
Probit estimations without controls Self Public
Smoke Drink Gamble Risky asset Debt Employed employed sector
RA∑n
i=0
RAt−i
(i+1)
-0.099⋆⋆⋆ -0.082⋆⋆⋆ -0.086⋆⋆⋆ -0.047⋆⋆⋆ -0.039⋆⋆⋆ -0.095⋆⋆⋆ 0.005 0.026
Clustered SE (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.011) (0.014)
Pseudo R2 0.015 0.011 0.011 0.003 0.002 0.013 0.000 0.001
observations 23,847 23,847 23,847 8,597 23,047 22,975 14,210 11,033
RA∑n
i=1
RAt−i
(i+1)
-0.056⋆⋆⋆ -0.038⋆⋆⋆ -0.034⋆⋆⋆ -0.029⋆⋆⋆ -0.008 -0.043⋆⋆⋆ -0.002 0.011
Clustered SE (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.007)
Pseudo R2 0.016 0.008 0.006 0.005 0.000 0.010 0.000 0.001
observations 15,712 15,712 15,712 6,247 15,263 15,126 9,343 7,201
RA t,t−1
2
-0.111⋆⋆⋆ -0.084⋆⋆⋆ -0.093⋆⋆⋆ -0.052⋆⋆⋆ -0.045⋆⋆⋆ -0.106⋆⋆⋆ 0.001 0.010
Clustered SE (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.013) (0.017)
Pseudo R2 0.016 0.010 0.012 0.004 0.003 0.015 0.000 0.000
observations 15,712 15,712 15,712 6,247 15,263 15,126 9,343 7,201
RA t,t−2
2
-0.121⋆⋆⋆ -0.076⋆⋆⋆ -0.091⋆⋆⋆ -0.032⋆ -0.049⋆⋆⋆ -0.109⋆⋆⋆ 0.014 0.001
Clustered SE (0.012) (0.013) (0.011) (0.015) (0.012) (0.012) (0.017) (0.022)
Pseudo R2 0.019 0.008 0.011 0.001 0.003 0.015 0.000 0.000
observations 9,367 9,367 9,367 3,198 9,093 8,974 5,500 4,209
RA t,t−3
2
-0.113⋆⋆⋆ -0.073⋆⋆⋆ -0.079⋆⋆⋆ -0.028 -0.047⋆⋆⋆ -0.107⋆⋆⋆ 0.015 -0.007
Clustered SE (0.013) (0.014) (0.012) (0.018) (0.013) (0.013) (0.018) (0.023)
Pseudo R2 0.016 0.007 0.008 0.001 0.003 0.015 0.000 0.000
observations 6,478 6,478 6,478 1,725 6,282 6,158 3,884 2,985
RA t,t−4
2
-0.123⋆⋆⋆ -0.079⋆⋆⋆ -0.075⋆⋆⋆ -0.021 -0.040⋆⋆ -0.091⋆⋆⋆ -0.001 0.001
Clustered SE (0.015) (0.016) (0.014) (0.018) (0.015) (0.015) (0.020) (0.026)
Pseudo R2 0.019 0.008 0.007 0.001 0.002 0.010 0.000 0.000
observations 3,912 3,912 3,912 1,730 3,799 3,686 2,390 1,854
RA t,t−5
2
-0.105⋆⋆⋆ -0.091⋆⋆⋆ -0.075⋆⋆⋆ -0.038 -0.039⋆ -0.066⋆⋆ -0.012 -0.018
Clustered SE (0.020) (0.022) (0.020) (0.022) (0.020) (0.020) (0.028) (0.036)
Pseudo R2 0.014 0.011 0.007 0.002 0.002 0.005 0.000 0.000
observations 1,556 1,556 1,556 1,193 1,518 1,476 919 714
Notes: ⋆ 10%, ⋆⋆ 5% and ⋆⋆⋆ 1% significance.
since risk aversion measured two years previously can still predict current behavior well.
For this reason, collecting risk aversion every two years would definitely raise the quality of
the use of the risk aversion measure in surveys. Alternatively, collecting the risk aversion
measure at least every two years provides for a valid analysis, as past risk aversion at
t− 2 predicts current behavior well.
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Table 16: Analyses with Average Risk-Aversion Variables on Current Behaviors
Probit estimations with controls Self Public
Smoke Drink Gamble Risky asset Debt Employed employed sector
RA∑n
i=0
RAt−i
(i+1)
-0.041⋆⋆⋆ -0.052⋆⋆⋆ -0.065⋆⋆⋆ -0.046⋆⋆⋆ -0.017 -0.045⋆⋆⋆ -0.013 0.031
Clustered SE (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.011) (0.009) (0.009) (0.013) (0.016)
Pseudo R2 0.195 0.083 0.046 0.068 0.092 0.177 0.075 0.047
observations 17,436 17,436 17,436 6,622 17,139 16,829 10,170 7,688
RA∑n
i=1
RAt−i
(i+1)
-0.036⋆⋆⋆ -0.029⋆⋆⋆ -0.024⋆⋆⋆ -0.025⋆⋆⋆ -0.007 -0.031⋆⋆⋆ -0.002 0.014
Clustered SE (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.009)
Pseudo R2 0.220 0.083 0.046 0.069 0.101 0.175 0.075 0.046
observations 11,776 11,776 11,776 4,867 11,603 11,356 6,825 5,120
RA t,t−1
2
-0.044⋆⋆⋆ -0.056⋆⋆⋆ -0.069⋆⋆⋆ -0.055⋆⋆⋆ -0.025⋆ -0.053⋆⋆⋆ -0.019 0.012
Clustered SE (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.015) (0.020)
Pseudo R2 0.217 0.082 0.049 0.070 0.101 0.173 0.076 0.045
observations 11,776 11,776 11,776 4,867 11,603 11,356 6,825 5,120
RA t,t−2
2
-0.050⋆⋆⋆ -0.047⋆⋆ -0.074⋆⋆⋆ -0.027 -0.030⋆ -0.059⋆⋆⋆ -0.008 0.003
Clustered SE (0.015) (0.016) (0.013) (0.018) (0.014) (0.014) (0.019) (0.026)
Pseudo R2 0.257 0.078 0.049 0.066 0.108 0.166 0.070 0.043
observations 7,131 7,131 7,131 2,566 7,022 6,849 4,093 3,049
RA t,t−3
2
-0.043⋆⋆ -0.046⋆⋆ -0.059⋆⋆⋆ -0.033 -0.033⋆ -0.061⋆⋆⋆ -0.013 -0.006
Clustered SE (0.016) (0.017) (0.014) (0.022) (0.016) (0.016) (0.021) (0.028)
Pseudo R2 0.261 0.081 0.050 0.064 0.116 0.157 0.065 0.048
observations 4,972 4,972 4,972 1,390 4,891 4,731 2,922 2,199
RA t,t−4
2
-0.054⋆⋆ -0.049⋆⋆ -0.051⋆⋆ -0.017 -0.025 -0.048⋆⋆ -0.029 0.008
Clustered SE (0.018) (0.019) (0.017) (0.022) (0.018) (0.018) (0.024) (0.031)
Pseudo R2 0.269 0.083 0.063 0.063 0.117 0.170 0.061 0.052
observations 3,021 3,021 3,021 1,394 2,974 2,845 1,829 1,392
RA t,t−5
2
-0.050⋆ -0.063⋆ -0.033 -0.028 -0.036 -0.048 -0.041 -0.045
Clustered SE (0.025) (0.026) (0.024) (0.026) (0.024) (0.025) (0.033) (0.040)
Pseudo R2 0.258 0.102 0.102 0.063 0.115 0.169 0.074 0.066
observations 1,228 1,228 1,228 977 1,209 1,164 725 551
Notes: ⋆ 10%, ⋆⋆ 5% and ⋆⋆⋆ 1% significance.
Control variables are gender, age, education, mother’s education, marital status and number of children.
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Table 17: Analyses with Average Risk-Aversion Variables on Current Behaviors - Re-
stricted Sample - 4 years
Probit estimations without controls Self Public
Smoke Drink Gamble Risky asset Debt Employed employed sector
RAt -0.086
⋆⋆⋆ -0.052⋆⋆⋆ -0.055⋆⋆⋆ -0.024 -0.036⋆⋆ -0.083⋆⋆⋆ 0.007 -0.010
Clustered SE (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.017) (0.011) (0.011) (0.015) (0.020)
Pseudo R2 0.012 0.005 0.005 0.001 0.002 0.011 0.000 0.000
observations 6,384 6,384 6,384 1,706 6,194 6,072 3,832 2,950
RAt−1 -0.089
⋆⋆⋆ -0.051⋆⋆⋆ -0.063⋆⋆⋆ -0.017 -0.035⋆⋆ -0.080⋆⋆⋆ 0.001 0.001
Clustered SE (0.011) (0.012) (0.010) (0.016) (0.011) (0.011) (0.015) (0.020)
Pseudo R2 0.013 0.005 0.007 0.000 0.002 0.011 0.000 0.000
observations 6,384 6,384 6,384 1,706 6,194 6,072 3,832 2,950
RAt−2 -0.087
⋆⋆⋆ -0.071⋆⋆⋆ -0.074⋆⋆⋆ -0.014 -0.038⋆⋆⋆ -0.075⋆⋆⋆ 0.011 0.009
Clustered SE (0.011) (0.012) (0.010) (0.017) (0.011) (0.011) (0.015) (0.020)
Pseudo R2 0.013 0.009 0.010 0.000 0.003 0.010 0.000 0.000
observations 6,384 6,384 6,384 1,706 6,194 6,072 3,832 2,950
RAt−3 -0.080
⋆⋆⋆ -0.052⋆⋆⋆ -0.063⋆⋆⋆ -0.016 -0.033⋆⋆ -0.074⋆⋆⋆ 0.015 0.003
Clustered SE (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.016) (0.010) (0.010) (0.014) (0.019)
Pseudo R2 0.012 0.005 0.008 0.000 0.002 0.010 0.000 0.000
observations 6,384 6,384 6,384 1,706 6,194 6,072 3,832 2,950
RA t,t−1
2
-0.116⋆⋆⋆ -0.068⋆⋆⋆ -0.079⋆⋆⋆ -0.026 -0.047⋆⋆⋆ -0.108⋆⋆⋆ 0.006 -0.006
Clustered SE (0.014) (0.015) (0.013) (0.019) (0.014) (0.014) (0.019) (0.025)
Pseudo R2 0.016 0.006 0.008 0.001 0.003 0.014 0.000 0.000
observations 6,384 6,384 6,384 1,706 6,194 6,072 3,832 2,950
RA t,t−2
2
-0.117⋆⋆⋆ -0.083⋆⋆⋆ -0.087⋆⋆⋆ -0.025 -0.050⋆⋆⋆ -0.107⋆⋆⋆ 0.012 -0.001
Clustered SE (0.014) (0.015) (0.013) (0.019) (0.013) (0.013) (0.019) (0.025)
Pseudo R2 0.017 0.009 0.010 0.001 0.003 0.014 0.000 0.000
observations 6,384 6,384 6,384 1,706 6,194 6,072 3,832 2,950
RA t,t−3
2
-0.114⋆⋆⋆ -0.071⋆⋆⋆ -0.081⋆⋆⋆ -0.026 -0.047⋆⋆⋆ -0.107⋆⋆⋆ 0.016 -0.004
Clustered SE (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.018) (0.013) (0.013) (0.018) (0.024)
Pseudo R2 0.016 0.007 0.008 0.001 0.003 0.014 0.000 0.000
observations 6,384 6,384 6,384 1,706 6,194 6,072 3,832 2,950
RA t,t−1,t−2,t−3
4
-0.145⋆⋆⋆ -0.096⋆⋆⋆ -0.107⋆⋆⋆ -0.027 -0.056⋆⋆⋆ -0.126⋆⋆⋆ 0.012 0.006
Clustered SE (0.017) (0.018) (0.015) (0.021) (0.016) (0.016) (0.022) (0.029)
Pseudo R2 0.021 0.010 0.012 0.001 0.003 0.016 0.000 0.000
observations 6,384 6,384 6,384 1,706 6,194 6,072 3,832 2,950
Notes: ⋆ 10%, ⋆⋆ 5% and ⋆⋆⋆ 1% significance.
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Table 18: Analyses with Average Risk-Aversion Variables on Current Behaviors - Re-
stricted Sample - 4 years
Probit estimations with controls Self Public
Smoke Drink Gamble Risky asset Debt Employed employed sector
RAt -0.038
⋆⋆ -0.037⋆ -0.041⋆⋆⋆ -0.028 -0.029⋆ -0.056⋆⋆⋆ -0.009 -0.015
Clustered SE (0.014) (0.014) (0.012) (0.020) (0.013) (0.013) (0.017) (0.023)
Pseudo R2 0.260 0.081 0.050 0.065 0.117 0.156 0.066 0.049
observations 4,902 4,902 4,902 1,376 4,823 4,665 2,883 2,172
RAt−1 -0.041
⋆⋆ -0.021 -0.049⋆⋆⋆ -0.022 -0.026⋆ -0.044⋆⋆⋆ -0.020 0.006
Clustered SE (0.013) (0.014) (0.012) (0.019) (0.013) (0.013) (0.018) (0.025)
Pseudo R2 0.260 0.080 0.051 0.065 0.117 0.155 0.067 0.049
observations 4,902 4,902 4,902 1,376 4,823 4,665 2,883 2,172
RAt−2 -0.029
⋆ -0.045⋆⋆⋆ -0.060⋆⋆⋆ -0.016 -0.024 -0.042⋆⋆ -0.008 0.015
Clustered SE (0.013) (0.014) (0.012) (0.019) (0.013) (0.013) (0.017) (0.025)
Pseudo R2 0.259 0.082 0.053 0.064 0.116 0.155 0.066 0.049
observations 4,902 4,902 4,902 1,376 4,823 4,665 2,883 2,172
RAt−3 -0.029
⋆ -0.031⋆ -0.048⋆⋆⋆ -0.022 -0.020 -0.036⋆⋆ -0.009 0.010
Clustered SE (0.013) (0.013) (0.011) (0.018) (0.012) (0.012) (0.017) (0.022)
Pseudo R2 0.259 0.081 0.051 0.065 0.116 0.154 0.066 0.049
observations 4,902 4,902 4,902 1,376 4,823 4,665 2,883 2,172
RA t,t−1
2
-0.053⋆⋆ -0.038⋆ -0.060⋆⋆⋆ -0.032 -0.037⋆ -0.066⋆⋆⋆ -0.019 -0.005
Clustered SE (0.017) (0.018) (0.015) (0.022) (0.016) (0.017) (0.022) (0.030)
Pseudo R2 0.261 0.081 0.051 0.065 0.117 0.157 0.066 0.049
observations 4,902 4,902 4,902 1,376 4,823 4,665 2,883 2,172
RA t,t−2
2
-0.045⋆⋆ -0.056⋆⋆ -0.069⋆⋆⋆ -0.030 -0.036⋆ -0.065⋆⋆⋆ -0.011 0.001
Clustered SE (0.017) (0.018) (0.015) (0.022) (0.016) (0.016) (0.022) (0.029)
Pseudo R2 0.260 0.082 0.052 0.065 0.117 0.156 0.066 0.049
observations 4,902 4,902 4,902 1,376 4,823 4,665 2,883 2,172
RA t,t−3
2
-0.045⋆⋆ -0.046⋆⋆ -0.062⋆⋆⋆ -0.033 -0.033⋆ -0.062⋆⋆⋆ -0.012 -0.002
Clustered SE (0.016) (0.017) (0.015) (0.022) (0.016) (0.016) (0.021) (0.028)
Pseudo R2 0.260 0.081 0.052 0.065 0.117 0.156 0.066 0.049
observations 4,902 4,902 4,902 1,376 4,823 4,665 2,883 2,172
RA t,t−1,t−2,t−3
4
-0.062⋆⋆ -0.059⋆⋆ -0.084⋆⋆⋆ -0.032 -0.038⋆ -0.070⋆⋆⋆ -0.023 0.014
Clustered SE (0.020) (0.021) (0.018) (0.025) (0.019) (0.019) (0.026) (0.034)
Pseudo R2 0.261 0.082 0.054 0.065 0.117 0.156 0.066 0.049
observations 4,902 4,902 4,902 1,376 4,823 4,665 2,883 2,172
Notes: ⋆ 10%, ⋆⋆ 5% and ⋆⋆⋆ 1% significance.
Control variables are gender, age, education, mother’s education, marital status and number of children.
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Table 19: Analyses with Average Risk-Aversion Variables on Current Behaviors - Re-
stricted Sample - 5 years
Probit estimations without controls Self Public
Smoke Drink Gamble Risky asset Debt Employed employed sector
RAt -0.091
⋆⋆⋆ -0.055⋆⋆⋆ -0.051⋆⋆⋆ -0.023 -0.033⋆ -0.077⋆⋆⋆ -0.002 -0.015
Clustered SE (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.017) (0.013) (0.013) (0.018) (0.024)
Pseudo R2 0.013 0.005 0.004 0.001 0.002 0.009 0.000 0.000
observations 3,825 3,825 3,825 1,702 3,720 3,609 2,348 1,822
RAt−1 -0.080
⋆⋆⋆ -0.051⋆⋆⋆ -0.049⋆⋆⋆ -0.017 -0.038⋆⋆ -0.075⋆⋆⋆ 0.005 -0.001
Clustered SE (0.013) (0.014) (0.012) (0.016) (0.013) (0.013) (0.018) (0.025)
Pseudo R2 0.010 0.004 0.004 0.000 0.002 0.009 0.000 0.000
observations 3,825 3,825 3,825 1,702 3,720 3,609 2,348 1,822
RAt−2 -0.098
⋆⋆⋆ -0.070⋆⋆⋆ -0.080⋆⋆⋆ -0.014 -0.035⋆⋆ -0.064⋆⋆⋆ 0.010 0.013
Clustered SE (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.017) (0.013) (0.013) (0.018) (0.023)
Pseudo R2 0.016 0.008 0.011 0.000 0.002 0.007 0.000 0.000
observations 3,825 3,825 3,825 1,702 3,720 3,609 2,348 1,822
RAt−3 -0.084
⋆⋆⋆ -0.062⋆⋆⋆ -0.072⋆⋆⋆ -0.016 -0.043⋆⋆⋆ -0.073⋆⋆⋆ 0.017 -0.003
Clustered SE (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.016) (0.012) (0.013) (0.018) (0.024)
Pseudo R2 0.013 0.007 0.010 0.000 0.003 0.010 0.001 0.000
observations 3,825 3,825 3,825 1,702 3,720 3,609 2,348 1,822
RAt−4 -0.088
⋆⋆⋆ -0.061⋆⋆⋆ -0.056⋆⋆⋆ -0.009 -0.027⋆ -0.054⋆⋆⋆ 0.004 0.013
Clustered SE (0.012) (0.013) (0.011) (0.015) (0.012) (0.012) (0.016) (0.020)
Pseudo R2 0.014 0.007 0.006 0.000 0.001 0.006 0.000 0.000
observations 3,825 3,825 3,825 1,702 3,720 3,609 2,348 1,822
RA t,t−1
2
-0.113⋆⋆⋆ -0.070⋆⋆⋆ -0.066⋆⋆⋆ -0.026 -0.046⋆⋆ -0.100⋆⋆⋆ 0.001 -0.011
Clustered SE (0.016) (0.017) (0.015) (0.019) (0.016) (0.016) (0.022) (0.029)
Pseudo R2 0.015 0.006 0.005 0.001 0.003 0.012 0.000 0.000
observations 3,825 3,825 3,825 1,702 3,720 3,609 2,348 1,822
RA t,t−2
2
-0.127⋆⋆⋆ -0.084⋆⋆⋆ -0.088⋆⋆⋆ -0.024 -0.045⋆⋆ -0.095⋆⋆⋆ 0.005 -0.002
Clustered SE (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.019) (0.015) (0.016) (0.021) (0.028)
Pseudo R2 0.019 0.009 0.010 0.001 0.003 0.011 0.000 0.000
observations 3,825 3,825 3,825 1,702 3,720 3,609 2,348 1,822
RA t,t−3
2
-0.119⋆⋆⋆ -0.079⋆⋆⋆ -0.084⋆⋆⋆ -0.025 -0.051⋆⋆⋆ -0.101⋆⋆⋆ 0.011 -0.012
Clustered SE (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.019) (0.015) (0.015) (0.021) (0.029)
Pseudo R2 0.017 0.008 0.009 0.001 0.003 0.013 0.000 0.000
observations 3,825 3,825 3,825 1,702 3,720 3,609 2,348 1,822
RA t,t−4
2
-0.124⋆⋆⋆ -0.080⋆⋆⋆ -0.074⋆⋆⋆ -0.021 -0.041⋆⋆ -0.090⋆⋆⋆ 0.001 0.000
Clustered SE (0.015) (0.016) (0.014) (0.018) (0.015) (0.015) (0.021) (0.026)
Pseudo R2 0.019 0.008 0.007 0.001 0.002 0.010 0.000 0.000
observations 3,825 3,825 3,825 1,702 3,720 3,609 2,348 1,822
RA t,t−1,t−2,t−3,t−4
5
-0.153⋆⋆⋆ -0.105⋆⋆⋆ -0.106⋆⋆⋆ -0.027 -0.058⋆⋆ -0.115⋆⋆⋆ 0.008 0.005
Clustered SE (0.018) (0.019) (0.017) (0.021) (0.018) (0.018) (0.025) (0.033)
Pseudo R2 0.023 0.011 0.011 0.001 0.003 0.013 0.000 0.000
observations 3,825 3,825 3,825 1,702 3,720 3,609 2,348 1,822
Notes: ⋆ 10%, ⋆⋆ 5% and ⋆⋆⋆ 1% significance.
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Table 20: Analyses with Average Risk-Aversion Variables on Current Behaviors - Re-
stricted Sample - 5 years
Probit estimations with controls Self Public
Smoke Drink Gamble Risky asset Debt Employed employed sector
RAt -0.041
⋆ -0.036⋆ -0.030⋆ -0.026 -0.026 -0.054⋆⋆⋆ -0.019 -0.016
Clustered SE (0.016) (0.017) (0.015) (0.020) (0.015) (0.016) (0.021) (0.027)
Pseudo R2 0.265 0.084 0.061 0.065 0.120 0.167 0.063 0.055
observations 2,954 2,954 2,954 1,372 2,910 2,784 1,794 1,365
RAt−1 -0.029 -0.030 -0.031
⋆ -0.022 -0.039⋆⋆ -0.049⋆⋆ -0.024 -0.007
Clustered SE (0.016) (0.016) (0.014) (0.019) (0.015) (0.016) (0.021) (0.029)
Pseudo R2 0.264 0.084 0.061 0.065 0.121 0.167 0.063 0.055
observations 2,954 2,954 2,954 1,372 2,910 2,784 1,794 1,365
RAt−2 -0.041
⋆ -0.035⋆ -0.065⋆⋆⋆ -0.017 -0.021 -0.031 -0.014 0.021
Clustered SE (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.019) (0.015) (0.016) (0.020) (0.029)
Pseudo R2 0.265 0.084 0.066 0.064 0.120 0.165 0.062 0.055
observations 2,954 2,954 2,954 1,372 2,910 2,784 1,794 1,365
RAt−3 -0.027 -0.041
⋆⋆ -0.050⋆⋆⋆ -0.023 -0.028 -0.037⋆ -0.013 0.001
Clustered SE (0.015) (0.016) (0.014) (0.018) (0.015) (0.016) (0.021) (0.030)
Pseudo R2 0.264 0.085 0.063 0.065 0.120 0.166 0.062 0.054
observations 2,954 2,954 2,954 1,372 2,910 2,784 1,794 1,365
RAt−4 -0.044
⋆⋆ -0.041⋆⋆ -0.045⋆⋆⋆ -0.003 -0.014 -0.022 -0.020 0.025
Clustered SE (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.018) (0.014) (0.015) (0.019) (0.024)
Pseudo R2 0.266 0.085 0.063 0.064 0.119 0.164 0.063 0.056
observations 2,954 2,954 2,954 1,372 2,910 2,784 1,794 1,365
RA t,t−1
2
-0.047⋆ -0.044⋆ -0.040⋆ -0.031 -0.043⋆ -0.068⋆⋆⋆ -0.029 -0.015
Clustered SE (0.020) (0.020) (0.018) (0.022) (0.019) (0.020) (0.026) (0.034)
Pseudo R2 0.265 0.084 0.061 0.065 0.121 0.168 0.063 0.055
observations 2,954 2,954 2,954 1,372 2,910 2,784 1,794 1,365
RA t,t−2
2
-0.055⋆⋆ -0.048⋆ -0.064⋆⋆⋆ -0.029 -0.032 -0.057⋆⋆ -0.022 0.004
Clustered SE (0.019) (0.020) (0.017) (0.022) (0.018) (0.019) (0.025) (0.033)
Pseudo R2 0.266 0.085 0.064 0.065 0.120 0.167 0.063 0.055
observations 2,954 2,954 2,954 1,372 2,910 2,784 1,794 1,365
RA t,t−3
2
-0.046⋆ -0.053⋆⋆ -0.055⋆⋆ -0.032 -0.037⋆ -0.061⋆⋆ -0.022 -0.010
Clustered SE (0.019) (0.020) (0.017) (0.022) (0.018) (0.019) (0.025) (0.035)
Pseudo R2 0.265 0.085 0.063 0.065 0.121 0.167 0.063 0.055
observations 2,954 2,954 2,954 1,372 2,910 2,784 1,794 1,365
RA t,t−4
2
-0.059⋆⋆ -0.053⋆⋆ -0.052⋆⋆ -0.019 -0.026 -0.051⋆⋆ -0.027 0.008
Clustered SE (0.019) (0.019) (0.017) (0.022) (0.018) (0.019) (0.024) (0.031)
Pseudo R2 0.266 0.085 0.063 0.064 0.120 0.166 0.063 0.055
observations 2,954 2,954 2,954 1,372 2,910 2,784 1,794 1,365
RA t,t−1,t−2,t−3,t−4
5
-0.066⋆⋆ -0.067⋆⋆ -0.075⋆⋆⋆ -0.031 -0.043⋆ -0.064⋆⋆ -0.037 0.012
Clustered SE (0.022) (0.023) (0.020) (0.025) (0.022) (0.023) (0.030) (0.039)
Pseudo R2 0.266 0.086 0.065 0.065 0.121 0.167 0.063 0.055
observations 2,954 2,954 2,954 1,372 2,910 2,784 1,794 1,365
Notes: ⋆ 10%, ⋆⋆ 5% and ⋆⋆⋆ 1% significance.
Control variables are gender, age, education, mother’s education, marital status and number of children.
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Table 21: Analyses with Average Risk-Aversion Variables on Current Behaviors - Re-
stricted Sample - 6 years
Probit estimations without controls Self Public
Smoke Drink Gamble Risky asset Debt Employed employed sector
RAt -0.082
⋆⋆⋆ -0.065⋆⋆⋆ -0.057⋆⋆ -0.039 -0.044⋆ -0.065⋆⋆⋆ 0.011 -0.021
Clustered SE (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.018) (0.018) (0.025) (0.035)
Pseudo R2 0.010 0.007 0.005 0.002 0.003 0.007 0.000 0.001
observations 1,506 1,506 1,506 1,166 1,472 1,430 894 692
RAt−1 -0.071
⋆⋆⋆ -0.051⋆⋆ -0.049⋆⋆ -0.004 -0.035⋆ -0.059⋆⋆ -0.009 0.001
Clustered SE (0.017) (0.019) (0.018) (0.020) (0.018) (0.018) (0.026) (0.035)
Pseudo R2 0.008 0.004 0.004 0.000 0.002 0.006 0.000 0.000
observations 1,506 1,506 1,506 1,166 1,472 1,430 894 692
RAt−2 -0.098
⋆⋆⋆ -0.093⋆⋆⋆ -0.076⋆⋆⋆ -0.008 -0.035 -0.074⋆⋆⋆ -0.002 -0.021
Clustered SE (0.018) (0.020) (0.019) (0.020) (0.018) (0.019) (0.027) (0.037)
Pseudo R2 0.014 0.013 0.009 0.000 0.002 0.008 0.000 0.001
observations 1,506 1,506 1,506 1,166 1,472 1,430 894 692
RAt−3 -0.088
⋆⋆⋆ -0.061⋆⋆⋆ -0.096⋆⋆⋆ -0.019 -0.052⋆⋆ -0.052⋆⋆ 0.021 -0.008
Clustered SE (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.017) (0.018) (0.026) (0.034)
Pseudo R2 0.013 0.007 0.016 0.001 0.005 0.005 0.001 0.000
observations 1,506 1,506 1,506 1,166 1,472 1,430 894 692
RAt−4 -0.089
⋆⋆⋆ -0.089⋆⋆⋆ -0.073⋆⋆⋆ -0.015 -0.040⋆ -0.073⋆⋆⋆ 0.018 -0.014
Clustered SE (0.017) (0.019) (0.018) (0.019) (0.017) (0.018) (0.025) (0.036)
Pseudo R2 0.014 0.014 0.009 0.000 0.003 0.009 0.001 0.000
observations 1,506 1,506 1,506 1,166 1,472 1,430 894 692
RAt−5 -0.076
⋆⋆⋆ -0.070⋆⋆⋆ -0.055⋆⋆ -0.018 -0.024 -0.032 -0.021 0.005
Clustered SE (0.016) (0.018) (0.017) (0.019) (0.017) (0.017) (0.024) (0.031)
Pseudo R2 0.010 0.009 0.006 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.000
observations 1,506 1,506 1,506 1,166 1,472 1,430 894 692
RA t,t−1
2
-0.099⋆⋆⋆ -0.075⋆⋆⋆ -0.069⋆⋆ -0.027 -0.051⋆ -0.081⋆⋆⋆ 0.002 -0.013
Clustered SE (0.020) (0.022) (0.021) (0.023) (0.020) (0.021) (0.029) (0.039)
Pseudo R2 0.012 0.007 0.006 0.001 0.003 0.008 0.000 0.000
observations 1,506 1,506 1,506 1,166 1,472 1,430 894 692
RA t,t−2
2
-0.119⋆⋆⋆ -0.105⋆⋆⋆ -0.088⋆⋆⋆ -0.031 -0.052⋆ -0.092⋆⋆⋆ 0.007 -0.027
Clustered SE (0.021) (0.023) (0.022) (0.023) (0.021) (0.021) (0.029) (0.041)
Pseudo R2 0.016 0.013 0.009 0.001 0.003 0.010 0.000 0.001
observations 1,506 1,506 1,506 1,166 1,472 1,430 894 692
RA t,t−3
2
-0.111⋆⋆⋆ -0.083⋆⋆⋆ -0.102⋆⋆⋆ -0.037 -0.063⋆⋆ -0.077⋆⋆⋆ 0.021 -0.019
Clustered SE (0.020) (0.022) (0.021) (0.022) (0.020) (0.021) (0.029) (0.039)
Pseudo R2 0.015 0.009 0.013 0.002 0.005 0.007 0.001 0.000
observations 1,506 1,506 1,506 1,166 1,472 1,430 894 692
RA t,t−4
2
-0.116⋆⋆⋆ -0.105⋆⋆⋆ -0.088⋆⋆⋆ -0.035 -0.056⋆⋆ -0.094⋆⋆⋆ 0.020 -0.023
Clustered SE (0.020) (0.022) (0.021) (0.023) (0.020) (0.021) (0.029) (0.042)
Pseudo R2 0.016 0.014 0.010 0.002 0.004 0.011 0.001 0.001
observations 1,506 1,506 1,506 1,166 1,472 1,430 894 692
RA t,t−5
2
-0.110⋆⋆⋆ -0.094⋆⋆⋆ -0.078⋆⋆⋆ -0.038 -0.046⋆ -0.066⋆⋆ -0.008 -0.011
Clustered SE (0.020) (0.022) (0.021) (0.023) (0.020) (0.021) (0.029) (0.037)
Pseudo R2 0.015 0.011 0.008 0.002 0.003 0.005 0.000 0.000
observations 1,506 1,506 1,506 1,166 1,472 1,430 894 692
RA t,t−1,t−2,t−3,t−4,t−5
6
-0.147⋆⋆⋆ -0.126⋆⋆⋆ -0.119⋆⋆⋆ -0.029 -0.066⋆⋆ -0.103⋆⋆⋆ 0.005 -0.016
Clustered SE (0.023) (0.025) (0.024) (0.026) (0.023) (0.024) (0.033) (0.044)
Pseudo R2 0.020 0.015 0.014 0.001 0.004 0.010 0.000 0.000
observations 1,506 1,506 1,506 1,166 1,472 1,430 894 692
Notes: ⋆ 10%, ⋆⋆ 5% and ⋆⋆⋆ 1% significance.
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Table 22: Analyses with Average Risk-Aversion Variables on Current Behaviors - Re-
stricted Sample - 6 years
Probit estimations with controls Self Public
Smoke Drink Gamble Risky asset Debt Employed employed sector
RAt -0.028 -0.033 -0.022 -0.037 -0.033 -0.047
⋆ 0.013 -0.049
Clustered SE (0.023) (0.023) (0.022) (0.024) (0.021) (0.023) (0.030) (0.039)
Pseudo R2 0.252 0.102 0.100 0.066 0.117 0.160 0.072 0.076
observations 1,191 1,191 1,191 953 1,174 1,129 703 532
RAt−1 -0.028 -0.016 -0.015 0.004 -0.048
⋆ -0.040 -0.049 -0.013
Clustered SE (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.021) (0.022) (0.030) (0.042)
Pseudo R2 0.252 0.100 0.100 0.064 0.119 0.159 0.076 0.072
observations 1,191 1,191 1,191 953 1,174 1,129 703 532
RAt−2 -0.039 -0.062
⋆⋆ -0.064⋆⋆ -0.001 -0.045⋆ -0.067⋆⋆ -0.057 -0.035
Clustered SE (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.022) (0.023) (0.031) (0.044)
Pseudo R2 0.253 0.105 0.105 0.064 0.119 0.163 0.076 0.074
observations 1,191 1,191 1,191 953 1,174 1,129 703 532
RAt−3 -0.031 -0.026 -0.064
⋆⋆ -0.009 -0.047⋆ -0.019 -0.012 -0.017
Clustered SE (0.021) (0.022) (0.021) (0.022) (0.020) (0.021) (0.029) (0.043)
Pseudo R2 0.252 0.101 0.105 0.065 0.119 0.158 0.072 0.072
observations 1,191 1,191 1,191 953 1,174 1,129 703 532
RAt−4 -0.042 -0.056
⋆ -0.049⋆ 0.008 -0.045⋆ -0.051⋆ -0.016 -0.023
Clustered SE (0.021) (0.022) (0.021) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021) (0.030) (0.044)
Pseudo R2 0.253 0.105 0.103 0.065 0.119 0.161 0.072 0.073
observations 1,191 1,191 1,191 953 1,174 1,129 703 532
RAt−5 -0.053
⋆⋆ -0.053⋆ -0.023 -0.008 -0.032 -0.027 -0.060⋆ -0.006
Clustered SE (0.020) (0.021) (0.020) (0.021) (0.020) (0.021) (0.028) (0.036)
Pseudo R2 0.255 0.105 0.100 0.065 0.118 0.158 0.078 0.072
observations 1,191 1,191 1,191 953 1,174 1,129 703 532
RA t,t−1
2
-0.037 -0.031 -0.024 -0.020 -0.053⋆ -0.057⋆ -0.025 -0.040
Clustered SE (0.025) (0.026) (0.025) (0.026) (0.024) (0.026) (0.034) (0.044)
Pseudo R2 0.252 0.101 0.100 0.065 0.119 0.160 0.073 0.074
observations 1,191 1,191 1,191 953 1,174 1,129 703 532
RA t,t−2
2
-0.045 -0.064⋆ -0.057⋆ -0.025 -0.053⋆ -0.077⋆⋆ -0.027 -0.055
Clustered SE (0.026) (0.027) (0.026) (0.027) (0.025) (0.027) (0.035) (0.046)
Pseudo R2 0.253 0.104 0.103 0.065 0.119 0.163 0.073 0.075
observations 1,191 1,191 1,191 953 1,174 1,129 703 532
RA t,t−3
2
-0.040 -0.039 -0.059⋆ -0.029 -0.054⋆ -0.044 -0.000 -0.044
Clustered SE (0.025) (0.026) (0.025) (0.027) (0.024) (0.026) (0.034) (0.046)
Pseudo R2 0.253 0.102 0.103 0.065 0.119 0.159 0.072 0.074
observations 1,191 1,191 1,191 953 1,174 1,129 703 532
RA t,t−4
2
-0.048 -0.061⋆ -0.049 -0.018 -0.053⋆ -0.067⋆⋆ -0.003 -0.047
Clustered SE (0.026) (0.027) (0.025) (0.027) (0.025) (0.026) (0.034) (0.048)
Pseudo R2 0.253 0.104 0.102 0.065 0.119 0.162 0.072 0.075
observations 1,191 1,191 1,191 953 1,174 1,129 703 532
RA t,t−5
2
-0.057⋆ -0.062⋆ -0.031 -0.029 -0.045 -0.051⋆ -0.037 -0.036
Clustered SE (0.025) (0.026) (0.025) (0.026) (0.024) (0.026) (0.034) (0.042)
Pseudo R2 0.254 0.104 0.100 0.065 0.118 0.160 0.074 0.073
observations 1,191 1,191 1,191 953 1,174 1,129 703 532
RA t,t−1,t−2,t−3,t−4,t−5
6
-0.066⋆ -0.074⋆ -0.070⋆ -0.012 -0.074⋆⋆ -0.074⋆ -0.056 -0.041
Clustered SE (0.028) (0.030) (0.029) (0.030) (0.028) (0.029) (0.040) (0.053)
Pseudo R2 0.254 0.105 0.103 0.065 0.120 0.161 0.075 0.073
observations 1,191 1,191 1,191 953 1,174 1,129 703 532
Notes: ⋆ 10%, ⋆⋆ 5% and ⋆⋆⋆ 1% significance.
Control variables are gender, age, education, mother’s education, marital status and number of children.
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5 Conclusion
This paper asks questions about risk aversion stability over time. Surveys often take
for granted that risk aversion is innate and time-invariant, resulting in a single measure
of individual preference toward risk. We ask whether risk aversion collected just once
can really be a valid measure. In order to test this hypothesis, we first find evidence of
risk aversion variance on a yearly basis using the Osaka panel, where self-reported risk
aversion is collected every year from 2003 to 2010. We then present evidence that the time
variation is not merely noise, as it also varies with income, age, and health variations. As
income increases, risk aversion decreases. Individuals who grow more anxious about their
health become more averse to risk. The older an individual, the more risk averse s/he is.
Hence, we find that risk aversion is indeed correlated with time-variant components as
well as time-invariant factors. We find the determinants of risk aversion using the random-
effects model built by Mundlak (1978). In terms of within-individual variation over time,
income variation is negatively correlated, age variation is positively correlated, and higher
education variation is negatively correlated with risk aversion. Between-variation across
individuals is estimated using the panel average of each variable such as gender, income,
age, health status, employment status, indebtedness, marital status, number of children,
and education. The characteristics that explain individual risk aversion levels the most
are being women (+), being older (+), being anxious about health (+), having debts (-),
and education level (-). These results clearly highlight the time-variant and time-invariant
components of risk aversion. Our question then is whether time-invariant factors play a
large role in predicting risk-related behaviors. If so, collecting the risk aversion measure
just once would be problematic because it would generate measurement errors. However,
using various lagged risk-aversion variables and different averages, we find that lagged
variables still have predictive power when it comes to behavior adopted by individuals.
The inference is that what matters most when predicting behavior is between-variations
across individuals, rather than the time-varying component within individuals. This
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means that we can still use the risk aversion difference between individuals as a good
predictor to explain different behaviors across individuals. Yet better predictive power
is obtained when using the average of risk aversion over the years. This could point to
a possible improvement in survey design, suggesting that risk aversion be collected not
just once, but at least every two years if we want to capture the time-variant component
of risk aversion.
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